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隐性知识共享的进化博弈分析
引用本文:韩璐,金永生.隐性知识共享的进化博弈分析[J].北京邮电大学学报(北京邮电大学学报),2008,10(6):55-59.
作者姓名:韩璐  金永生
作者单位:北京邮电大学,经济管理学院,北京,100876
摘    要:对于企业来说隐性知识比显性知识更有价值,但是隐性知识的共享却一直是知识管理中的难点。结合进化博弈理论,通过研究参与者在知识共享过程中的态度和利益的变化,设计了一种进化博弈模型,找出了隐性知识难以共享的原因和知识分享的发展路径,期望帮助企业通过共享隐性知识来提高企业的效率、推动企业创新,形成良好的企业“共享文化”。

关 键 词:隐性知识  知识共享  进化博弈  知识管理

Analysis of recessive knowledge sharing by evolutionary games theory
HAN Lu,JIN Yong-sheng.Analysis of recessive knowledge sharing by evolutionary games theory[J].Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition),2008,10(6):55-59.
Authors:HAN Lu  JIN Yong-sheng
Institution:School of Economics and Management, BUPT, Beijing 100876, China
Abstract:For a company, recessive knowledge is much more valuable than visible knowledge, whereas it is difficult to make recessive knowledge shared in knowledge management. Based on the evolutionary games theory, the changes of the participators' attitude and their benefits are researched in knowledge sharing processes, and then an evolutionary games model is proposed. With this model, the reason why recessive knowledge is hard to be shared and the path of knowledge sharing is found. If taking advantage of recessive knowledge, companies would improve their efficiency, innovation, and competition ability. As a result, a good "sharing culture" will emerge.
Keywords:recessive knowledge  knowledge sharing  evolutionary games theory  knowledge management
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