首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


RISK AVERSION AND OVERBIDDING IN FIRST PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS: NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Authors:Sascha Fü  llbrunn,Dirk‐Jan Janssen,Utz Weitzel
Abstract:
Bidding above the risk‐neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets. We find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding. (JEL D44, C91)
Keywords:
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号