基于不完全契约的高新技术风险企业控制权结构选择及其影响因素研究

文章从风险企业家与风险投资家风险偏好、风险投资家干预行动、控制权私有收益以及分阶段融资等方面对Gebhardt-Schmidt(2006)与Jean-Etienne(2008)模型进行综合与扩展,比较分析了相机控制与联合控制两类控制权配置结构的适用范围与影响因素。理论研究得出,风险投资家的监控干预成本、风险企业家的融资额与控制权私人非货币收益、风险投资家在重新谈判中的讨价还价能力与持有的企业赎回权、项目失败时风险企业的清算价值以及风险投资家风险规避系数,与联合控制的选择概率正相关、与相机控制的选择概率负相关;风险投资家战略目标的实现度与联合控制的选择概率负相关、与相机控制的选择概率正相关。

Research on the Selection and the Influencing Factors of Control Rights Structure in Venture Capital-backed New High-tech Firms Based on Incomplete Contract

By introducing the risk preferences of venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist,venture capitalist's intervention action,private benefit of control rights and stage financing,this paper extends and rebuilds the model of Gebhardt-Schmidt (2006) and Jean-Etienne (2008),to analyze the application scopes and influencing factors of the two control structure which are contingent control and joint control. The result of theory research shows that,when entrepreneurs have a high financial constraint,venture capitalist's liquidity constraints and monitoring cost are high;entrepreneur have greater private benefit of control rights;bargaining and redemption power of venture capitalist in re-negotiation is stronger;VC-backed Firms have high liquidation value;venture capitalist's strategic objectives are smaller and risk aversion coefficient is high;and,the joint control is strictly superior to contingent control.