| Abstract: | The reforms of the Italian pension system approved by Parliament at the end of 1992 and in the summer of 1995 have been strongly conditioned by two goals of general economic policy: the re-equilibrium of the government budget and a new approach in the relationship between state and market. In this paper the author examines the main aspects of those reforms, analysing the consequences on the pension system of pursuing the general aims of economic policy. In particular, after having noticed the positive modifications, three criticisms are pointed out. (1) The extension of the private and funded component of old-age insurance, apart from its negative effect on the efficiency of the entire pension system, implies subsidizing above-average incomes at the expense of the lower ones. (2) The abolition of the link between real wages and pensions decided by the reforms implies a cut in the intergenerational contract which is dangerous from both an economic and a social point of view. (3) The political context has influenced some relevant technical aspects of the new pension system, causing some inconsistencies on operational grounds. |
