Price controls, trade protectionism and political business cycles in the U.S. steel industry

The U.S. steel industry is subject to a microeconomic political business cycle resulting from U.S. Presidents designing protectionist policies on behalf of the steel industry; experiencing complaints from consumers and foreign producers as a result of the policy; modifying the policy which results in complaints from the steel industry; and finally, maneuvering policy back in favor of the industry to achieve re-election. Using a cointegrating vector error correction framework, this paper tests the hypothesized political business cycle for its effect on steel prices. We find that trade protectionism does not seem to have succeeded in its primary objective of supporting prices. By expending so much political capital on ineffective trade protection, the steel industry may have lost the opportunity to focus on more substantive issues that might have restrained factor cost and enhanced its competitive ability. The devolution of the steel industry, ironically, may have resulted from it's persistent pleas for protection. Political business cycles in the steel industry, with all its attendant negative consequences, would not occur if the steel industry did not continually lobby for protection.