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“机会—意愿”视角下的反腐败研究
引用本文:倪星,肖汉宇,陈永亮.“机会—意愿”视角下的反腐败研究[J].广州大学学报(社会科学版),2010,9(8):5-12,36.
作者姓名:倪星  肖汉宇  陈永亮
作者单位:中山大学廉政与治理研究中心、政务学院,广东,广州,510275
基金项目:广东省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目 
摘    要:基于珠三角B市和C市港资企业与政府打交道的访谈调研,从"机会"和"意愿"两个维度对行政性腐败风险进行研究。研究发现,从"机会"维度来看,政府间竞争以及企业自身话语权的上升挤压了腐败的空间,规则和财政管理制度的完善弱化了腐败的制度动力。从"意愿"维度来看,由于制度环境的变化,个体在腐败决策中需要考虑的成本上升、收益下降,腐败的意愿也在下降。虽然市场化带来了新的腐败模式,但这一模式在实践中并不多见。

关 键 词:行政性腐败  机会  意愿  制度激励  正式规则

Anticorruption research in the perspective of" opportunity and willingness"
NI Xing,XIAO Hanyu,CHEN Yongliang.Anticorruption research in the perspective of" opportunity and willingness"[J].Journal of Guangzhou University(Social Science Edition),2010,9(8):5-12,36.
Authors:NI Xing  XIAO Hanyu  CHEN Yongliang
Institution:NI Xing,XIAO Hanyu,CHEN Yongliang(Center for Anticorruption Studies of Sun Yat-sen University,School of Government,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510275,China)
Abstract:Based on the interviews on the relationship between government and HK enterprises of city B and city C in the Pearl Delta area,this paper explores the risk of administrative corruption in the perspective of opportunity and willingness.The research finds that,in the dimension of opportunity,competition among governments and the elevation of enterprises' speaking right have narrowed down the space for administrative corruption;improvements of formal regulations and fiscal managerial institutions have weakened...
Keywords:administrative corruption  opportunity  willingness  institutional incentive  formal rules  
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