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旅游景区经营权转让探析
引用本文:阎友兵,赵黎明.旅游景区经营权转让探析[J].西北农林科技大学学报,2005,5(3):92-96.
作者姓名:阎友兵  赵黎明
作者单位:天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
摘    要:旅游景区的经营权转让问题倍受人们关注,正反双方各执己见,反方担心经营权转让过程中会导致国有资产流失,经营权转让后不利于景区可持续发展。由于作为转让方的政府和作为受让方的企业处于一个重复博弈的纳什均衡中,企业为了其长期利益必然会保护景区的环境和资源,政府通过转让经营权来实现景区的综合价值,推动景区发展是完全可行的。要达到景区经营权转让的既定目的,政府必须在转让前后做好立法、景区资产评估、监督管理等工作。

关 键 词:旅游景区  经营权转让  重复博弈模型
文章编号:1009-9107(2005)03-0092-05
修稿时间:2004年7月1日

A Probe Into the Transfer of Managerial Authority at a Scenic Spot
YAN You-bing,ZHAO Li-ming.A Probe Into the Transfer of Managerial Authority at a Scenic Spot[J].Journal of Northwest Sci-Tech University of Agriculture and Forestry(Social Science),2005,5(3):92-96.
Authors:YAN You-bing  ZHAO Li-ming
Abstract:The transfer of managerial authority at a scenic spot draws much attention, the positive and the negative sticks to each of their own views.The negative worries about that it may cause such problems as a drain on state-owned property and unsustainable development of the spot.In Nash Equilibrium,in order to get a long profit, the enterprises will protect environment and resources so that they can bring about the comprehensive value of scenic spots and propel it forward .The government need to do those work, such as making laws, property assessment and supervision.
Keywords:scenic spot  the transfer of managerial authority  repeated game model
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