| Abstract: | In this article we model the determinants of severance pay for individual dismissals in Spain, following an idea proposed by Jimeno and Toharia (Economistas 55: 243–255, 1993). We point out the importance of severance pay settled before judgment, since the legal framework creates a bargaining space to determine the amount paid by firms in cases of individual dismissal. The model is a simple pre‐trial bargaining game between the firm and the worker. It predicts a higher settled severance pay for dismissals on economic grounds than on disciplinary ones, which could explain the perceptions held about the wide use of disciplinary dismissals in Spain. In addition, this approach could be useful in designing labour market reforms aimed at changing dismissal costs, because it allows us to determine the key variables affecting settled severance pay. Our simple model predicts that the key variables for Spain are the severance pay for unfair dismissal and the probability of unfair dismissal. |
