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基于上游成员的机会成本和消费者偏好的供应链产品策略
引用本文:温小琴,胡奇英.基于上游成员的机会成本和消费者偏好的供应链产品策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(6):62-71.
作者姓名:温小琴  胡奇英
作者单位:1. 上海大学管理学院, 上海 200444; 2. 复旦大学管理学院, 上海 200433
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671046)
摘    要:基于对上游成员的机会成本和消费者在质量偏好上的异质性的考虑,本文研究中心化和由一零售商与一制造商(供应商)组成的分散化供应链在质量和数量上的最优产品策略。通过构建问题的理论模型及分析,分别获得最优解和博弈均衡解。进而利用灵敏度分析和算例讨论了消费者对质量偏好的异质性和上游成员的机会成本对供应链的产品策略、供应链的利润和消费者剩余的影响。研究发现:当边际质量成本较低时,供应链产品策略应主要考虑满足大众需求;而当边际质量成本和消费者对质量偏好的异质性程度都较高时,供应链只需考虑部分高质量敏感的消费者;当消费者对质量的平均偏好水平较低,边际质量成本较高和顾客需求趋于同质时,产品应考虑退出市场;此外,成员的权利均衡有助于完善供应链利润和社会福利,而零售商的强势帮助消费者培育和提高产品质量。最后,占据先动优势的一方在利润分配时基本上占上风。

关 键 词:供应链管理  消费者偏好  机会成本  产品策略  Stackelberg博弈  
收稿时间:2015-09-30
修稿时间:2018-01-14

Supply Chain Product Strategy with the Consideration of the Opportunity Cost of Upstream Members and Consumers' Heterogeneous Preference in Quality
WEN Xiao-qin,Hu Qi-ying.Supply Chain Product Strategy with the Consideration of the Opportunity Cost of Upstream Members and Consumers' Heterogeneous Preference in Quality[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018,26(6):62-71.
Authors:WEN Xiao-qin  Hu Qi-ying
Institution:1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China; 2. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
Abstract:Based on the opportunity cost of upstream members and consumers' heterogeneous preference in quality, the optimal product strategy in quality and quantity for both the centralized and decentralized supply chain is explored. The decentralized supply chain consists of a retailer and a manufacturer (supplier), and the sequence of game between these two supply chain members is as follows:First, the retailer proposes a quality level for the supply chain product; then the manufacturer (supplier) determines the product's wholesale price charged to the retailer; third the retailer decides the order quantity under the wholesale price; the product strategy in quality and quantity and the wholesale price will be written in the contract developed for two parties if the negotiation between members succeeds; finally, the manufacturer (supplier) organizes the production activity as the product strategy described in the contract. An optimization model and a game model for the centralized and decentralized supply chain problems are formulated respectively, and the optimal solution and Nash equilibrium solution are obtained. Further, the impact of the consumers' heterogeneous preference in quality and opportunity cost of upstream members on supply chain product strategy, supply chain's profit and consumers' surplus are discussed through sensitivity analysis and numerical examples. Our analysis illustrates some management insights:(1) when the average consumers' preference level in quality is high, the supply chain should take a product strategy with high quantity and high quality and high price; (2) the supply chain product strategy should be to more focus on the public demand when the marginal cost of quality is low; whereas the supply chain only needs to consider the high-end demand with higher quality sensitivity and higher willingness to pay when the consumers' preference in quality is greatly heterogeneous and the marginal cost of quality is high; (3) The product should be considered to exit from the market with low average consumers' preference level in quality, high marginal cost of quality and homogeneous customers' preference in quality since both the supply chain performance and consumers' surplus are very low for this case; (4) the balance of power distribution among channel members is critical to obtain a higher supply chain's profit and social welfare; whereas it is key for the downstream retailer to achieve a stronger power in supply chain decisions if the supply chain strategy is to focus on consumers' cultivation and improve the product quality. Finally, in our research framework, the first mover advantage in the profit sharing is identified.
Keywords:supply chain management  consumers' preference  opportunity cost  product strategy  Stackelberg game  
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