两级供应链中延保服务与基础质保服务交互策略

延保服务已成为商家获取高额利润的重要手段。本文以一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链为对象，分别在单主体（制造商或零售商）和两主体同时提供延保（偏向于制造商或零售商延保）情形下，研究最优延保定价、产品定价及延保与基础质保交互的决策。结果表明：维修成本直接影响延保的提供方式。仅制造商或零售商提供延保时，延保期限对基础质保期限有明显促进或抑制作用，且制造商提供延保有利于制造商和零售商。两者同时提供延保时，延保竞争促使其价格降低，且消费者偏向于某主体时，其延保价格相对高于另一方；基础质保与延保的交互关系取决于竞争程度。当消费者偏向制造商延保时，供应链各方所获取的利润较为稳健，相对高于单一主体提供延保情形时的利润。

Optimal Strategy of the Interaction between Extended Warranty and Base Warranty in a Two-echelon Supply Chain

With decreasing profit margins on durable products, extended warranty has become an important profitability source. In such a case, manufacturers, retailers or the both may sell extended warranties to achieve high marginal profits. In this paper, the optimal extended warranty price and product price as well as the impact of warranty service on base warranty in a supply chain are examined. To address such challenging issues, a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered. The manufacturer produces a product bundled with a base warranty and sells it through the retailer. The extended warranty can be offered by the manufacturer, the retailer or both. Specifically, in the last case, consumers may prefer to extended warranty provided by the manufacturer or the retailer. Theoretical models in the three scenarios are developed by using game theory. The results show that who offering extended warranty depends on warranty cost. When extended warranty is provided by a single entity, extended warranty has a positive (or negative) effect on base warranty if extended warranty is only provided by the manufacturer (or the retailer) and it is beneficial for both members when extended warranty offered only by the manufacturer. When both players providing extended warranty, warranty competition leads to reduce extended warranty price; and when consumers prefer to a player's extended warranty, its price is higher than that of the other. In this case, the interaction between the base warranty and the extended warranty depends on the competition level. In particular, when consumers prefer to the manufacturer's extended warranty, both players' profits are relatively stable and higher than those when only one player offers the service. Our findings can provide theoretical supports for practical warranty service management and can further enrich related research.