考虑政府引导制造商节能的闭环供应链决策模型研究

运用动态博弈方法研究政府引导下制造商生产单位产品的节能程度对闭环供应链决策的影响，分别建立了由制造商、回收商及消费者构成的闭环供应链的集中式和分散式决策模型，讨论了政府如何设置最优节能程度来实现企业利润和社会责任均衡。同时通过利润补偿机制对供应链进行协调。研究发现：为了更好地提高能源节约水平，政府应设置基准节能程度；回收率随着政府制定的基准节能程度增加而增加；在政府制定相同的基准节能程度下，集中式闭环供应链比分散式闭环供应链的节能程度高；在政府制定相同的基准节能程度下，制造商利润随着政府制定的基准节能程度增加而提高，而回收商利润随着政府制定的基准节能程度增加而减少。为了提高回收商积极性，探讨了利润补偿的协调机制。算例分析验证了上述结论的正确性。

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision Model of Considering the Government Guidance on Manufacturer Energy Saving

With the rapid development of economy in our country, the problems of environmental pollution become increasingly serious. The original products, which are high-pollution, high-consumption and low-output, cannot meet the demands of people's lives.The products, which are low-carbon, green energy-saving, environment-friendly, get more and more attention from the government, companies and consumers. Therefore, a manufacturer should produce environment-friendly products to meet the consumption demand.Although this mode will limit the enterprise development in a short period, it will provide more competitive and sustainable development for the enterprise in the end. For those reasons, the government should guide the manufacturer to produce the product. In this paper, the dynamic game method is used to study the influence on closed-loop supply chain decisions, which, under the guidance of government, depend on the energy saving degree of the manufacturer's production unit. Two closed-loop supply chain models-centralized supply chain model and decentralized supply chain model, consisting of a manufacturer, a collector and a consumer, are established. How should the government set the optimal level of benchmark energy saving to achieve the balance of corporate profits and social responsibility is additionally considered. At the same time, a compensation mechanism is used to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that the government should set the benchmark energy saving level in order to better improveenergy saving. The recovery rate increases with the increasing of benchmark energy efficiency.On the condition of the same benchmark energy saving level, the centralized supply chain has higher energy saving. Besides, when at the same benchmark energy saving level circumstances, the profits of manufacturer increase, while the profits of collector decrease, with increasing of the benchmark energy saving level. To activate the collector, a profit compensation contract is designed. The correctness of the above conclusions is verified by the example analysis.On the one hand, the results of this paper can provide guidance for the supply chain enterprises, which are under the energy-saving constrain. On the other hand, it can also provide theoretical support for the government to make the optimal benchmark energy-saving degree.