预测更新与信息不对称下的行业联盟契约优化设计

在允许需求预测更新且存在信息不对称条件下,研究了行业联盟契约优化设计问题。首先,研究了行业联盟集中决策时的最优契约。然后,在不对称条件下,探讨了行业联盟中生产商使用补贴函数时的最优契约及其相关性质。最后,在不对称条件下,给出了行业联盟中生产商采用风险分配比例函数时的最优契约及其相关性质。研究结果表明,允许需求预测更新,存在信息不对称时,行业联盟中生产商可以使用补贴和风险分担的方法使行业联盟达到最优。

An optimal design for contract of industry alliance under condition of updating forecast and of asymmetric information

Under the condition of updating demand forecasts and of asymmetric information,the optimal design for the contract of industry alliances is investigated.First of all,the optimal contract of industry alliances is studied in centralized decision-making.Then,under the condition of asymmetric information,the use of subsidies by producers in industry and the related nature of the optimal contract are explored.Finally,under asymmetric conditions,the optimal contract and the relevant qualities are discussed when producers adopt the function of risk allocation ratio.The results show that under the condition of updating demand forecasts and of asymmetric information,producers in industry alliances can use the subsidies and risk-sharing approach to realize the optimal effect of industry alliances.