中国上市公司机构持股时对大股东控制与盈余管理关系的影响研究

以中国上市公司中大股东与盈余管理的关系为研究对象,从机构持股时对大股东控制与盈余管理两者关系的影响这一视角出发,说明机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。以沪、深市A股上市公司2007年的满足研究要求的公司治理和财务数据为例,通过建立研究假设和研究模型进行实证验证。研究发现以6%为机构持股高低的分界点,机构持股比例高时,可以抑制大股东控制对会计盈余的操纵,起到积极股东的作用;当机构持股比例低时,则可以加剧大股东控制对会计盈余的操纵,起到消极股东的作用。

The Study about the Relation Between Earning Management and Large Shareholder Control and Effects the Relation when Institutional Investors Shareholding in China Listed Companies

This paper is that to study about the relation between earning management and large shareholder,illustrates the role of institutional investors in corporate governance from the perspective of the how to effect between large shareholding control and the earnings management of listed companies when institutional shareholding.In Shanghai,Shenzhen A shares listed companies in 2007 to meet the research requirement of corporation governance and financial data for the study of data,through the establishment of research hypotheses and research model,through empirical test.The study finds that with the shareholding ratio to a level of 6% as the boundary.when the shareholder ratio of institutional investors is high,institutional investors can inhibit the large shareholder control on manipulation of earnings management,When the proportion of institutional investors holds low,it could increase manipulation of the large shareholding control to earnings management.