Roads and roadblocks to dual commitment: Similar and dissimilar antecedents of union and company commitment

Dual commitment received wide attention during the 1950s and, after a waning of interest during the 1960s and 1970s, interest has grown anew. In this study of dual commitment we used a model of investment and returns, applied referent theory to it, and grounded the investigation in an industrial relations context at an airline carrier in order to examine both company and union commitment. We found that wages were a positive income elastic good with respect to company commitment, but they were a negative good with respect to union commitment. Information obtained from the firm or the union also resulted in divergencies in the commitments. External labor market variables were unrelated to union commitment, but they were related to company commitment. Finally, job influence and perceptions concerning a labor-management program were positive predictors of the two commitments; as such, they have implications for the way firms and unions may want to build dual commitment. We thank Peter Cappelli, Fritz Drasgow, Peter Feuille, Greg Oldham, Lawrence T. Pinfield, and Dean Tjosvold for helpful comments.