无偿服务非营利组织中的委托-代理关系

通常认为,由于不存在利润激励,无偿服务非营利组织中将存在着严重的激励问题。但是大量事实证明,无偿服务非营利组织往往有着与营利性组织同样的运行效率,这说明利润以外的激励因素有着格外重要的意义。

Principal-Agent Relation in the Organization for Gratuitous Services

Because there is no profit incentive, the organizations for gratuitous services are generally considered having serious incentive difficulty, but most of which have the same efficiency as for-profit-enterprises. This implied that, except profits, many other incentive mechanisms are also important. Output benchmark and self-incentive are main incentives in the organizations for gratuitous services. The paper analyzes these two incentive mechanisms using principal-agent model and indicates that the long term benefit and altruism can produce strong incentive to the agents, but the existence of the uncertainty weakens their incentive effects.