非对称信息条件下业务外包的质量评价和转移支付决策

研究了不同信息条件下业务外包的产品质量评价问题,在文献[l,2]基础上考虑购买商作为委托人和供应商作为代理人建立了业务外包的委托代理模型。其中,质量预防水平为供应商的决策变量,购买商对供应商的转移支付和质量评价水平为购买商的决策变量。本文考虑了供应商质量预防信息隐匿情况,重点研究了非对称信息下业务外包的质量评价和转移支付问题,运用极大值原理推导了购买商的质量评价和转移支付的最优解。最后结合一个农机公司拖拉机生产业务外包问题进行了仿真计算和分析,对比了不同信息环境下的决策结果。

Quality Evaluation and Transfer Payment Decision in Outsourcing under Asymmetric Information

Quality evaluation decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information backgrounds.Based on references[1,2],a principal agent model for outsourcing is set up with regards to buyer as principal and supplier as agent.In the model,quality prevention is supplier decision variable,quality evaluation and transfer payment are buyer decision variables.Focus is on the study of quality evaluation and transfer payment decision in outsourcing under asymmetric infomation when supplier prevention information is hidden.Maximal principle is used to get the solution to quality evaluation.At last simulation calculation is done concerned with an agricultural machines company's tractor production outsourcing problem.Simulation results under different information backgrounds are analyzed and compared.