Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency |
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| Authors: | Grant Simon Kajii Atsushi Polak Ben |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia;(2) Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia;(3) Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia |
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| Abstract: | We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent. |
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| Keywords: | Information Non-expected utility Dynamic consistency Randomization Anxiety |
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