大学科技园与地方高新园区协同创新的博弈分析

文章以跨园区协同创新为视角,探讨了大学科技园与地方高新园区协同创新的内涵、创新主体和协同创新过程,并进一步引入演化博弈理论,选择大学与高新园区企业作为大学科技园与地方高新园区的代表,构建两者协同创新的博弈模型。然后,基于博弈模型,进行博弈结果分析,并针对影响博弈结果的三个要素进行博弈策略设计。结果表明,大学与地方高新园区企业选择跨园区协同创新合作的概率与双方在原园区内的初始收益、协同创新投入和溢出系数呈反比,与违约损失呈正比;同时,合理分配双方投入比例、降低溢出系数和提高违约损失至一定额度,均可有效促成合作。文章最后依据以上结论从协同创新的动机、协调和政府支撑三个方面提出了若干对策建议。

Game Analysis of Collaborative Innovation between University Science Park and Local High-Tech Industrial Park

From the perspective of collaborative innovation,this paper,taking university science park and local high-tech industrial park as research objects,analyzed the subject and the process of collaborative innovation.Furthermore,this paper chose universities and enterprises of high-tech park as the representatives of university science park and local high-tech industrial park.Based on the evolutionary game theory,it built the game model of collaborative innovation.Results show that the probability of reaching a consensus on collaborative innovation between two parks had a negative correlation with the initial earnings,collaborative innovation investment and spillover coefficient,and had a positive correlation with loss given default;while controlling the range of investment proportion,spillover coefficient and loss given default can promote the success of collaborative innovation.Finally,some policy suggestions were provided.