中国医疗体制改革中激励问题研究

在我国医疗体制改革中存在着由于医生与患者的信息不对称而产生道德风险问题,为了规避这种行为的发生,运用霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆的多项任务委托-代理模型对医生的激励问题加以分析,得出医生的收入不应只与业务数量挂沟,更应该对其业务质量上的努力给予更高的重视,最后对我国未来医疗体制改革问题提出相关的建议：医院要注重管理;建立医疗服务评价机制,用信誉指数替代表达医生的私人信息;建立病人对医生的医疗服务评价机制。

Study on Incentive Problems During China's Medical System Reforming

There are moral hazards which come from asymmetric information between doctors and patients during China's medical system reforming.Doctors' incentive problems are analysed by multi-task principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom to elude this action happening.As a result,doctors' wages should have not only something with service quantity,but also with service quality.In the end,this article proposes some suggestions for China's medical system reforming in the future:hospitals should pay attention to management,establish system of medical appraisal using credit index to express personal information,establish system in which patients give doctors medical appraisal.