噪声申购者、市盈率管制与投资者收益

基于信息不对称的IPO抑价理论认为一级市场因定价偏低而给投资者带来了正向超额收益,但近年来基于噪声交易者参与的行为金融研究对此提出了异议.从套利的角度将新股中购者分为套利投资者和噪声申购者,采用供需分析方法,以新股上市首日的基础价值为基准,重点探讨中国现金配售制度下投资者在一级市场定价和申购过程中的收益问题,并分析市盈率管制对收益的影响.研究表明,现金配售制度下,新股投资者收益与中签率有关,在新股申购过程中,套利投资者可以通过申购数量的调整进行套利活动,但此套利受噪声申购者影响而存在约束.当噪声申购量小于发行量时,数量套利有效,新股抑价发行,但投资者只能获得合理收益,此时市盈率管制对投资者收益没有影响;当噪声中购量大于发行量时,数量套利受限,新股存在定价偏高的可能,且当定价高于某一特定值(小于基础价值)时,投资者即获得负向异常收益,此时适当的市盈率管制可以起到保护投资者的作用.

Noise Traders,the Offer PE Ratio Constraint and the Initial Return of IPOs

The theories of IPO under-pricing based on the information asymmetry insist that there is a positive abnormal return for investors in the primary market for the under-pricing of IPOs,but it is doubted by the behavioral finance considering of noise traders recently.This paper classed the investors in the primary market to arbitragers and noise traders from the arbitraging perspective,then analyzed the return of the investors from the primary market under the system of cash rationing in China and the effect o...