电力市场中关于直购电力价格的讨价还价博弈模型

运用鲁宾斯坦的轮流出价讨价还价模型的思想,构造发电公司与大用户之间关于直购电力价格的不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”以及它们关于对方实时电力价格预期的估计。最后提出应提高实时电力市场透明度的政策建议。文中的模型及其结论同样也适用于发电公司和配电公司之间的讨价还价博弈。

The Bargain Game Model on Electric Power Price in a Bilateral Electricity Market

This paper constructs the bargain game model with incomplete information and alternating offers between power generation company and power consumer,by using the thought of Rubinstein alternating offers.Then solving the model and analyzing the conclusions,it believes that,whether the two bargainers can reach the bargain lies on "the cost of bargaining" and their estimations on others expectatiions of spot price.At last,the paper proposes that we should enhance the transparency of power spot market.The model and conclusions are also applied for game between power generation company and distribution company.