自建VS.并购:物流一体化竞争下的电商平台演化博弈

在竞争环境下,各大电商平台相继以自建或并购方式完成了自营物流系统的建设。文章立足于电商平台的物流一体化建设实践,以自建和并购作为电商平台构建物流体系的备选策略,首先采用逆序归纳法分别求得了两平台在均采取物流自建方案、均采取物流并购方案及一方采取物流自建方案而另一方采取物流并购方案时的均衡利润;然后,基于演化博弈理论,对不同均衡点的稳定性进行了分析;最后,得出了四种不同的演化稳定均衡结果。结果表明:(1)如果物流自建投入明显低于物流并购投入,且买家需求对竞争对手的物流服务不敏感时,两平台均将物流自建作为占优方案,从而双方的演化博弈将形成唯一的混同均衡--(物流自建,物流自建)。(2)如果物流并购投入明显低于物流自建投入,且买家需求对竞争对手的物流服务不敏感时,两平台均将物流并购作为占优方案,从而双方的演化博弈将形成唯一的混同均衡--(物流并购,物流并购)。(3)如果两种物流一体化方案的前期固定投入差异较小,且后期运营支出对物流服务水平不敏感,买家需求对对方平台的物流服务敏感时,两平台均无占优策略,而是采取与对手方案相同的物流一体化策略,使得双方的演化博弈形成两个混同均衡--(物流自建,物流自建)与(物流并购,物流并购)。(4)如果两种物流一体化方案的前期固定投入差异较小,且后期运营支出对物流服务水平不敏感,买家需求对对方平台的物流服务不敏感时,两平台均无占优策略,而是选择与对手方案相异的物流一体化策略,从而双方的演化博弈将形成两个分离均衡--(物流自建,物流并购)与(物流并购,物流自建)。

Self-construction Versus Merger and Acquisition: Evolutionary Game of E-commerce Platforms on Logistics Integration Competition

Facing the fierce logistics aging market competition,many e-commerce platforms have begun to establish their own logistics systems through self-construction or merger and acquisition(M&A). In view of this, self-construction and M&A are considered as alternatives to two e-commerce platform oligarchs with the intention of building a self-operated logistics system. Firstly, the reverse induction method is used to solve the equilibrium profits of the two platforms when they both adopt self-construction mode, both adopt M&A mode, and one adopts self-construction mode while the other adopts M&A mode respectively. Then, based on the evolutionary game theory, the stability of different equilibrium points are analyzed. Finally, four different evolutional stable equilibriums are obtained. The research conclusions are as follows:(1)If self-construction's investment is obviously lower than that of M&A, and the buyer's demand is not sensitive to the competitive platform's logistics services, both platforms will take self-construction as the dominant strategy, so the pooling equilibrium (self-construction, self-construction) can be formed. (2)If M&A's input is obviously lower than that of self-construction,and the buyer's demand is not sensitive to the competitive platform's logistics service, both platforms will take M&A as the dominant strategy, so the pooling equilibrium (M&A, M&A) can be formed. (3)If the two logistics integration modes have a different fixed input in the early stage, and the operating cost in operational phase is not sensitive to logistics service, when the buyer's demand is sensitive to the logistics service of the other platform, neither platforms have dominant strategy, but they will choose the same logistics integration mode to the competitor's as their optimal stratgey, so two pooling equilibriums which are (self-construction, self-construction) and (M&A, M&A) can be formed. (4)If the difference on fixed input between the two logistics integration modes is small, and the operating cost is not sensitive to logistics service level, when the buyer's demand is not sensitive to the other platform's logistics service, neither platforms have dominant strategy, but they will choose a different logistics integration mode to the competitor's as their optimal stratgey, so two separating equilibriums which are (self-construction, M&A) and (M&A, self-construction) can be formed.