考虑保鲜努力与增值服务的生鲜电商供应链最优决策与协调

针对一个生鲜电商与一个生鲜供应商组成的供应链,其中生鲜电商负责销售农产品并提供增值服务,而生鲜供应商负责农产品的保鲜配送。考虑保鲜努力与服务水平均会影响生鲜农产品的市场需求,通过构建集中式与分散式下的生鲜电商供应链决策模型,分析了新鲜度需求弹性、服务需求弹性等因素对最优决策的影响,并对比分析了分散式与集中式决策下的最优决策。在此基础上,设计了"收益共享-双向成本分担"契约,通过合理设计契约参数实现了生鲜电商供应链的完美协调与帕累托改进。最后,进一步深入分析了供应链在协调前后的最优决策变化,并用数值算例进行了考察与验证。研究发现:供应链在协调后必然会提高产品新鲜度与服务水平,但可能会导致更低或更高的生鲜农产品销售价格。当新鲜度需求弹性与服务需求弹性较低时,生鲜电商在协调后会制定相对更低的产品价格,实施"优质低价"策略;而在新鲜度需求弹性或服务需求弹性高于某一水平时,生鲜电商在协调后会制定相对更高的产品价格,实施"优质优价"策略。

Optimal Strategies and Coordination of Fresh E-commerce Supply Chain Considering Freshness-Keeping Effort and Value-Added Service

With the rapid development of the Internet and the quick popularization of E-commerce, more and more enterprises are involved in the field of fresh e-commerce. At the same time, as the consumption of fresh produce changes and upgrades, some fresh e-commerce companies choose to provide fresh produce as well as value-added service to meet customer demand. Besides, they have in-depth cooperation with suppliers, in which suppliers deliver fresh produce with freshness-keeping. In this context, both high level of freshness-keeping effort and value-added service can increase fresh produce demand. However, in such a fresh e-commerce supply chain, freshness-keeping effort and value-added service are respectively provided by different parties who may have free-rider behavior with relying on the other's effort. In addition, both parties aim to maximize their own profit, which may lead to deviation in the optimal strategies and thereby reduce supply chain performance. To solve this problem, the problem of optimal strategies and coordination of fresh e-commerce supply chain considering fresh-keeping effort and value-added service are studied.The main work in this paper includes the following four parts. First, the centralized and decentralized game models of fresh e-commerce supply chain considering freshness-keeping effort and value-added service level affecting the market demand of fresh produce are established, and the impacts of the elasticity of freshness and the elasticity of service on optimal strategies are analyzed, and the optimal strategies are compared in both models. Second, a revenue sharing-two way cost sharing contract is designed to achieve the perfect coordination and Pareto improvement of fresh e-commerce supply chain. Third, the changes in optimal strategies before and after coordination are analyzed. Finally, some conclusions are verified through numerical examples.The results show that, first, under the decentralized decision, with the increase of the elasticity of freshness, the fresh e-commerce always reduces the product price and the level of service, while the fresh supplier faces the choice of whether to improve freshness-keeping effort. When the elasticity of freshness is higher than a certain level, the fresh supplier will reduce freshness-keeping effort. Second, the revenue sharing-two way cost sharing contract can effectively coordinate the fresh e-commerce supply chain and realize Pareto improvement. Third, the product freshness and service level must be improved after supply chain coordination, but it could lead to a lower or higher price of fresh produce. When the elasticity of freshness and the elasticity of service are relatively low, the fresh e-commerce will make a relatively lower product price after coordination, and implement the strategy of "high-quality with low price". However, when the elasticity of freshness or the elasticity of service is higher than a certain level, the fresh e-commerce will make a relatively higher product price after coordination, and implement the strategy of "high-quality with high price".