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不完全信息下发电商竞价策略贝叶斯博弈分析
引用本文:张新华,叶泽.不完全信息下发电商竞价策略贝叶斯博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(4):147-149.
作者姓名:张新华  叶泽
作者单位:长沙理工大学管理学院,湖南,长沙,410076
摘    要:电力竞价是一个不完全信息下的博弈问题.论文假定竞争对手的报价服从已知区间a,b]上的独立同分布,基于贝叶斯博弈原理,分别对容量相同的双寡头市场、容量相同与不同情况下的多个发电商的竞价进行了模型化分析,并给出了发电商的最优报价.最后,给出了简单算例分析.

关 键 词:贝叶斯博弈  次序统计量  不完全信息  竞价策略  电力市场
文章编号:1004-6062(2007)04-0147-03
修稿时间:2005年8月15日

Bayesian Game Analysis of Bidding Strategy of Generation Company with Incomplete Information
ZHANG Xin-hua,YE Ze.Bayesian Game Analysis of Bidding Strategy of Generation Company with Incomplete Information[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2007,21(4):147-149.
Authors:ZHANG Xin-hua  YE Ze
Abstract:Power bidding is a game process with imcomplete information.Based on the hypothesis that the bids of the rivals are stochastic variable drawn from same distribution over given interval,the optimal bidding models are presented with Bayesian game principle,and three situations are considered respectively,which include duopoly power market with same genaration capacity and the markets consisted of more than two generators with same or different genaration capacity.Then the optimal bidding strategys of generation companies are deduced.At last,a simple numerical example is presented to illustate the presented method.
Keywords:bayesian game  order statistic  incomplete information  bidding strategy  electricity market
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