法经济学视野下“公地悲剧”的博弈分析

法经济学认为，制度是影响资源利用的关键因素。在对“公地悲剧”进行博弈分析时，离不开对制度在博弈过程中发挥的作用的分析。传统博弈理论将“公地悲剧”当作“囚徒困境”博弈的观点实为一种误导。“囚徒困境”是特定制度设计的结果，在特定制度安排下，参与人之间的信息交流被严格禁止，博弈报酬结构具有特定的制度偏好，导致博弈各方无法达成合作。而在“公地悲剧”中，参与人可以自由地进行信息交换，进而可以自发达成合作协议对公共资源进行有效自主治理。因此，“保证博弈”，而不是“囚徒困境”博弈才是“公地悲剧”博弈分析的恰当模型。

Game Theory of "Tragedy of the Commons" from the Perspective of Law and Economics

The theory of law and economicsholds that institutions are the key point for the resources utilization.Therefore,the game analysis of “Tragedy of the Commons” should not ignore the function institutions play.It is a misguiding that the traditional game theory regards “Tragedy of the Commons” as “Prisoner’s Dilemma”.The game of “Prisoner’s Dilemma” is consequence of special institutions arrangement.In this circumstance,the players can not have cooperation because the information exchange has been strictly prohibited and the institutions have special prefer.On the contrary,the players can share information freely and eventually reach consensus about governing the commons effectively in “Tragedy of the Commons”.Thus,“Guaranty Game”,not “Prisoner’s Dilemma”,is proper model to describe “Tragedy of the Commons”.