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环境会计信息披露的博弈论分析
引用本文:卢成龙.环境会计信息披露的博弈论分析[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2005,20(1):117-120.
作者姓名:卢成龙
作者单位:山东财政学院,山东,济南,250014
摘    要:环境会计日益受到世界各国的关注,环境会计信息披露作为环境会计的最基本问题之一自然成为人们广泛关注的焦点。目前,我国企业对环境会计信息的披露仍然不容乐观,为了深入了解影响环境会计信息披露的因素,有必要对有关利益主体之间的博弈关系进行分析:企业和政府这对利益主体通过系列博弈会达到一种经济学上的“帕累托最优”;社会和企业之间形成了合作博弈;在股东和经营者的博弈过程中,监督成本、激励成本、增加闲暇等精神方面的机会成本和经营者偏离股东目标的损失之间此消彼长,相互制约。

关 键 词:环境会计信息  博弈论  环境商誉
文章编号:1672-8580(2005)01-0117-04

The Game- Theory Analysis of Environmental Accounting Information Disclosure
Lu Chenglong.The Game- Theory Analysis of Environmental Accounting Information Disclosure[J].Journal of Sichuau University of Science & Engineering:Social Sciences Edition,2005,20(1):117-120.
Authors:Lu Chenglong
Abstract:Environmental accounting is gradually attracting more and more attention in the world. As one of the essential aspects, the reporting of the environmental accounting information becomes the focus of people. Nowadays, we have no abrupt confidence in them. So in order to acknowledge deeply the influential factors, it s necessary to analyze the interaction between counterparts in the game theory. Through series of game corporations, governments will reach to "Pareto - optimality" . Corporations and the society have the form of cooperative game. In the game between shareholders and operators, opportunity costs concerning spiritual aspects, such as supervising cost, promoting cost and the adding of leisure time, will be in a state of reciprocity, with the loss, which is raised by the managing departure.
Keywords:environmental accounting information  game theory  environmental good wills
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