| 拍卖中卡特尔的两种合谋机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 敬辉蓉,李传昭. 拍卖中卡特尔的两种合谋机制研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2008, 22(3): 130-133 |
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| 作者姓名： | 敬辉蓉 李传昭 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044;重庆师范大学旅游学院,重庆400047;重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 摘 要： | 投标者合谋损害了拍卖者的利益、破坏了社会资源的配置效率.本文通过建立教学模型,研究具有货币补偿支付"强"卡特尔的两种典型合谋机制.发现在卡特尔内部预拍卖中.不同的利益分享机制其成员的汇报价不同.进一步地.当合谋人数等于投标总人数时.第二密封价格的公开拍卖比第一密封价格拍卖更有利于卡特尔的合谋,此时,拍卖者采用隐藏保留价的第一密封价格拍卖,是占优策略.而当卡特尔成员数小于投标总人数时,拍卖者不公布保留价.卡特尔第一价格合谋机制就没有效率,卡特尔第二价格合谋机制在卡特尔代表的估价高于预拍卖第二高价时,合谋非效率.
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| 关 键 词： | 拍卖 卡特尔 合谋 |
Two Cartel Collusion Mechanism in Auction |
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| GOU Hui-rong,LI Chuan-zhao. Two Cartel Collusion Mechanism in Auction[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2008, 22(3): 130-133 |
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| Authors: | GOU Hui-rong LI Chuan-zhao |
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| Affiliation: | GOU Hui-rong~(1,2),LI Chuan-zhao~1(1.The College of Economy & Management,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China,2.The Tourism College,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 400047,China) |
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| Abstract: | Bidder collusion may be detrimental for both social efficiency and auctioneer's revenue.This paper established a model to study the features of strong cartel who has side-payment to all losing bidders.It is found that the members of cartel don't report their truth evaluation about the item in the secondprice collusion scheme and in the first-price collusion scheme.Furthermore,The second-price auction is better benefit for cartel collusion than the first-price auction.In the public auction,the numbers of car... |
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| Keywords: | auction cartel collusion |
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