| 基于动态博弈模型的我国公立医院寻租行为治理研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 高山,石建伟.基于动态博弈模型的我国公立医院寻租行为治理研究[J].扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版),2013(6):34-38,45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 高山 石建伟 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]南京中医药大学经贸管理学院,江苏南京210023 [2]复旦大学公共卫生学院,上海200032 |
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| 摘 要： | 制度监管的缺失加剧了我国公立医院的寻租行为。通过溯源制度缺陷,研究引入寻租动态博弈模型,分析了公立医院的寻租活动,所得博弈均衡解证实了寻租之必然,其中惩罚和监督成本是影响寻租的重要要素。以制度空隙弥补为原则,提出创新监督治理机制、完善法律制度,强化声誉机制和道德约束等制度来消散寻租行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 公立医院 寻租 治理 博弈 |
Rent-seeking Behavior of Chinese Public Hospitals： A Study Based on Dynamic Game Model |
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| GAO Shan,SHI Jianwei.Rent-seeking Behavior of Chinese Public Hospitals： A Study Based on Dynamic Game Model[J].Journal of Yangzhou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition),2013(6):34-38,45. |
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| Authors: | GAO Shan SHI Jianwei |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Economy and Trade Management, Nanjing University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Nanjing 210023, Jiangsu, China; 2. School of Public Health, Fudan University, Shanghai 200032, China) |
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| Abstract: | The absence of institutional supervision has worsened the rent-seeking behavior of Chinese public hospitals.The dynamic game model is employed to analyze the rent-seeking activities of public hospitals.The gaming equilibrium has confirmed the inevitability this sort of behavior and it shows that the cost of punishment and supervision counts much.It is suggested that institutional supervision should be strengthened,the related legal system improved,and that reputation and moral constraint be applied. |
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| Keywords: | public hospitals rent-seeking governance game |
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