| 建设项目业主与监理单位之间委托——代理机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张建龙,毕星. 建设项目业主与监理单位之间委托——代理机制分析[J]. 西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2008, 38(6) |
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| 作者姓名： | 张建龙 毕星 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西北工业大学,管理学院,陕西西安,710072
2. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 为了研究建设工程外包监理机制设计的博弈关系,设计了业主与监理之间的委托—代理模型,分析了对称信息和不对称信息条件下二者之间在监理外包建设工程项目方面的委托—代理机制。分析结果为企业之间的建设工程项目监理外包活动提供了理论支持。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理 建设工程 外包 不对称信息 |
Principal-agent analysis between owner and supervisor in construction engineering outsourcing pattern |
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| ZHANG Jian-long,BI Xing. Principal-agent analysis between owner and supervisor in construction engineering outsourcing pattern[J]. Journal of Northwest University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2008, 38(6) |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Jian-long BI Xing |
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| Abstract: | In order to study the game relationship of supervisor mechanism design of construction engineering,a principal-agent model between owner and supervisor was designed and their principal-agent mechanism of supervisor outsourcing of construction engineering was analyzed under symmetry information or asymmetry information.The results provide theoretical support for supervisor outsourcing of construction engineering between enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent construction engineering outsourcing asymmetry information |
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