When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, PR China;2. School of Computer, Electronics and Information, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, PR China;3. Guangxi Key Laboratory of Multimedia Communications and Network Technology, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, PR China;1. Medical Education, Department of Community Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, University of Calgary, 3330 Hospital Dr. N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 4N1, Canada;2. Educational Studies in School Psychology, Faculty of Education, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 4N1, Canada |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
We ask whether conformity, copying the most observed behavior in a population, affects free riding. Our model suggests that, if sufficiently frequent at the start of a public goods game, conformity will increase the growth rate of free riding. We confirm this prediction in an experiment by showing that free riding grows faster when players have the information necessary to conform. As a stricter test, we econometrically estimate the dynamic on which the model is based and find that, controlling for the payoff incentive to free ride, players react significantly to the number of free riders in their groups. |
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