| 论经营者控制权激励下的企业非效率投资 |
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| 引用本文： | 袁春生.论经营者控制权激励下的企业非效率投资[J].山西大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,29(1):64-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 袁春生 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710061;山西财经大学,会计学院,山西,太原,030006 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业控制权是企业的重要决策权,拥有控制权能够使经营者获得各种控制权收益。控制权收益的损失所具有的不可补偿性使得经理人在经营管理活动中,具有对控制权收益攫取和维护的激励,因而在财务决策中更多地体现其自身利益最大化目标,而非股东价值最大化,反映在企业投资领域就是各种非效率的投资行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 经营者 控制权 控制权收益 激励 非效率投资 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-5935(2006)01-0064-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年3月29日 |
On the Enterprise's Inefficient Investment Driven by Manager's Control Right |
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| YUAN Chun-sheng.On the Enterprise''''s Inefficient Investment Driven by Manager''''s Control Right[J].Journal of Shanxi University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition),2006,29(1):64-66. |
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| Authors: | YUAN Chun-sheng |
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| Abstract: | Control right of an enterprise is an important decision-making power.It can make the managers who have this power obtain various kinds of benefits of control right.The losses of these benefits can not be compensated so that the managers have incentive to seize and maintain the benefits of control right in their operational and managerial activities.It embodies the manager's own interests, not the maximum of shareholder's value when they make the financial decisions,which reflect kinds of inefficient behaviors in the field of enterprise's investment. |
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| Keywords: | manager control right benefit of control right incentive inefficient investment |
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