| 假冒伪劣商品治理中的政府官员行为分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 谢桂生,阮平南. 假冒伪劣商品治理中的政府官员行为分析[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 5(1): 5-8 |
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| 作者姓名： | 谢桂生 阮平南 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京工业大学,经济与管理学院,北京,100022 |
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| 基金项目： | 北京市自然科学基金;9032001; |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了假冒伪劣商品治理中的政府官员行为,对于政府官员的渎职,提出了设计激励制度和改造组织 信息结构2种解决方法,证明了在对政府官员进行有效激励的前提下,对政府官员进行寻租的行为将不会发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 假冒伪劣商品 渎职 寻租 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-0398(2005)01-0005-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-05-17 |
The Analysis of Government Officials'''' Behavior in Deterring Counterfeit & Inferior Commodities |
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| XIE Gui-sheng,RUAN Ping-nan. The Analysis of Government Officials'''' Behavior in Deterring Counterfeit & Inferior Commodities[J]. Journal of Beijing Polytechnic University(Social Sciences Edition), 2005, 5(1): 5-8 |
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| Authors: | XIE Gui-sheng RUAN Ping-nan |
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| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the government officials' behavior of deterring counterfeits & inferior commodities. To solve malfeasance behavior of the government officials, we put forward two methods, the one is designing incentive contract and the other is reconstructing organization's information structure. For the more, in this paper it is proved that if the government official get suitable incentive there will not be rent-seeking taking place. |
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| Keywords: | counterfeit & inferior commodities malfeasance rent-seeking |
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