供应风险下双源采购批发单价拍卖最优设计

考虑多个具有供应风险和成本私有信息的潜在供应商,研究了供应商投标批发单价的最优双源采购拍卖机制设计.首先,针对一般的采购商收益函数,求出了最优的订货量分配规则和供应商投标均衡,并分别与单源采购及对称信息对比,发现双源采购拍卖增加了采购商和供应商的期望利润,不对称信息对供应商有利但对采购商和供应链不利.然后,分别针对报童及垄断环境,进一步分析了双源采购拍卖下的订货分散程度、信息价值和双源采购价值,发现,订货分散程度与供应风险及两个获胜者的利润率贡献相近程度正相关;高成本获胜者比成本较低者索取更高的单位信息租金,导致不对称信息下的订货分散程度比对称信息下低;供应风险越高或投标人数越多时,双源采购价值越大.

Optimal design of wholesale-price auctions for dual-sourcing with supply risks

Considering multiple potential suppliers with supply risk and private cost information,this paper studies the optimal design of dual-sourcing auctions where the suppliers bid the wholesale prices.Firstly,under a general buyer revenue function,the optimal allocation rule and suppliers' bidding equilibrium are derived,and the results are compared with the single-sourcing case and the symmetric information case,respectively.Comparisons show that both the buyer and suppliers gain more expected profits than under the optimal single-sourcing mechanism,and information asymmetry benefits suppliers but hurts the buyer and the entire supply chain.Then,in a newsvendor setting and a monopoly setting,the paper further analyzes the diversification degree of quantity allocation,the effects of information asymmetry,and the value of the dual-sourcing option.Results show that the diversification degree of quantity allocation increases with the supply risk and the homogeneity level of winners' profit-margin contributions to the buyer.The higher-cost winner charges a higher per unit information rent than the lower-cost winner does,which results in a lower diversification degree as compared with the symmetric information case.Moreover,when the supply risk or the number of bidders increases,the value of the dual-sourcing option increases.