| 试论新闻传播在乡村治理中的反作用 |
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| 引用本文： | 车英,袁松,张月盈. 试论新闻传播在乡村治理中的反作用[J]. 武汉大学学报(人文科学版), 2008, 61(1): 107-111 |
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| 作者姓名： | 车英 袁松 张月盈 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 武汉大学新闻与传播学院,湖北,武汉,430072
2. 华中科技大学中国乡村治理研究中心 |
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| 摘 要： | 税费改革之后,媒体成为农民获取政策信息的最主要的来源。上级政府的政策信息以大众传播的模式通过传媒的政策报道、典型报道、批评报道及常规新闻节目直接向农民受众传递。村民与基层干部之间、村民与村民之间基于不同的利益角度对这些“直达”的政策精神做出的不同解释,使得基层治理中的意见分歧越来越大。这一方面削弱了基层组织的权威,增加了基层政权采取作为的难度,另一方面也强化了农村公共品自我供给的困难。
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| 关 键 词： | 大众传媒 乡村治理 反作用 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-881X(2008)01-0107-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-05-23 |
Mass Media to Rural Governance in China:Dysfunctions |
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| Che Ying,Yuan Song,Zhang Yueying. Mass Media to Rural Governance in China:Dysfunctions[J]. Wuhan University Journal (Humanity Sciences), 2008, 61(1): 107-111 |
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| Authors: | Che Ying Yuan Song Zhang Yueying |
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| Affiliation: | Che Ying , Yuan Song , Zhang Yueying (1. School of Journalism ＆ Communication, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China 2. Center for Rural China Governance, Huazhong University of Science ＆ Technology) |
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| Abstract: | Mass media is the primary channel for presents to get the policy information after the revenue reform. The senior government＇s policy information delivers directly to present by policy coverage, typical coverage, critical coverage and other news programs instead of by the notice of cadre at the basic level. The model of information transmission, on one hand makes everyone encode his particular understanding for one policy owing his own interest, on the other hand increases the dissatisfaction of the present to their government officials in dealing with the village. This condition decreases the authority of basic government, meanwhile, reinforces the difficulty of supplying the public facilities by themselves. |
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| Keywords: | mass media rural governance dysfunction |
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