产品异质性、成本差异与不完全议价能力企业技术许可

建立了包含产品异质性、研发溢出、企业吸收能力、创新规模、创新后企业间成本差异以及创新企业的讨价还价能力等现有文献中多数可量化参数的多阶段博弈模型,力图统一关于创新企业技术许可而出现的多样性结论.研究结论表明:1)当创新后企业间成本差异足够大时,创新企业存在垄断的可能性,但这种可能性可能被产品间足够大的异质程度所打破;2)创新企业讨价还价能力的作用不仅在于"数量"(许可得益大小)上的获得,更在于"质量"(许可方式)上的选择.3)R&D溢出、吸收能力以及创新规模通过对创新后企业间的成本差异起作用,间接地对企业的技术许可行为产生影响;4)创新企业的讨价还价能力并非在所有由成本差异和产品替代程度所构成的区域内都对技术许可方式的选择产生影响.在创新后企业间成本差异较小时,不管创新企业的讨价还价能力和企业间产品替代程度如何,产量提成许可总是最优;而在成本差异和产品替代程度都较大时,固定费许可最优.但在某些特定的区域内,最优的技术许可方式随着创新企业讨价还价能力的增强从产量提成许可转向固定费许可.

Product heterogeneity,cost difference and technology licensing of enterprise with incomplete bargaining power

This paper establishes a multi-stage game model which includes such majority quantifiable parameters as product heterogeneity,R&D spillover,enterprise absorptive capacity,innovation scale,cost difference after innovation and bargaining power in the existing literatures,and tries to unify the diversified conclusions on technology-licensing behavior of innovator.The results show that: 1) the possibility that the innovator becomes monopoly when the cost differences between enterprises after innovation is large enough is not likely to take place owing to large heterogeneity between products;2) the role of innovator’s bargaining power lies not only in gains on "quantity"(licensing gains),but also choice of "quality"(choosing licensing strategies);3) R&D spillover,enterprise absorptive capacity and innovation scale have an indirect impact on the innovator’s licensing behavior by the cost difference between enterprises after innovation;4) the innovator’s bargaining power can work on the behavior only in the part of region comprised of the cost difference and product heterogeneity constantly.When the cost difference is small,output-royalty licensing is always optimal for innovators,regardless of bargaining power and product differentiation.When the cost difference and product differentiation are rather large,fixed-fee licensing is always optimal.But the optimal ways of licensing are from output-royalty to fixed-fee in the specified region as the innovator’s bargaining power becomes larger.