基于处理基金和拆解补贴的电器电子产品CLSC研究

依据《废弃电器电子产品处理基金征收使用管理办法》,将处理基金和拆解补贴引入到电器电子产品闭环供应链中来。在第三方回收、制造商回收和销售商回收三类回收方式下,从拆解资质的视角,分别分析了每类回收方式中制造商的拆解策略。通过对三类回收方式的比较,依据单位处理基金的大小,得出回收方式对制造商申请拆解资质与否的影响。对具有拆解资质的制造商,得出分散决策下制造商的最优策略是委托销售商进行回收。合作决策下,制造商申请拆解资质也可能使系统收益不增反降,出现供应链不稳定的局面。因此,具有拆解资质的制造商应加大回收力度,确保回收率不低于单位处理基金和单位废旧品补贴之比;不具有拆借资质的制造商也要在衡量自身逆向回收渠道的竞争力后,再决定是否申请拆解资质。最后用算例对结论进行了详细验证。

Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Processing Funds and Dismantling Subsidies

Used electrical and electronic products have entered a peak period in China. According to statistics, the amount of annual scrapped electrical and electronic products is about 50 million to 80 million units, average annual growth is 20%, to the end of the Twelfth Five Year Plan, the amount of annual scrapped electrical and electronic products will exceed 160 million units. Wasted electrical and electronic products have become a urgent challenge for China and the world.Based on "processing funds collection management approach of wasted electrical and electronic products", electrical and electronic products manufacturers require to pay dismantling funds, dismantling enterprises get dismantling subsidies, closed-loop supply chain system is changed as policy changes. But now, the processing funds and the dismantling subsidies are not considered in analyzing closed-loop supply chain model. Based on this, the processing funds and the dismantling subsidies are introduced to the electrical and electronic products closed-loop supply chain model in this paper, under three kinds of recovery mode, from the perspective of dismantling qualification, models are constructed respectively, using game theory, manufacturers' dismantling strategy is analyzed for each type of recovery mode. By comparing the three recovery modes, it is found that, if ft, then regardless of the recovery mode, manufacturer who has dismantling qualification can get extra income from reverse recovery channels. If H_t< f< H_m, then it is beneficial for manufacturers to apply for the dismantling qualification on manufacturer recycling or retailer recycling, on the contrary, manufacturers cannot maximize its profits by applying for the dismantling qualification on third-party recycling. If H_m< f< H_r, then manufacturers who have dismantling qualification can increase their profits on retailer recycling, manufacturers' optimal strategy is to deal with the dismantling process by the dismantling companies on manufacturer recycling or third-party recycling. If f>H_r, then regardless of which recovery mode, handling the dismantling process by the dismantling companies is manufacturers' optimal strategy. For manufacturers who have dismantling qualification, retailer recycling is manufacturers' optimal strategy under decentralized decision. Under collaborative decision-making, iff>H_Σ, system earnings is declined when manufacturer makes the application of dismantling qualification. If fΣ, then the manufacturer applying for the dismantling qualification can increase system earnings.Therefore, supply chain system may is still not stable under collaborative decision-making. So, manufacturers who have dismantling qualification should increase recovery efforts level, and ensure recovery rates is not less than the value of unit processing funds divided by unit subsidies, the manufacturer who has not dismantling qualification should measure the competitiveness of recycling channels, and then decide whether to apply for dismantling qualification. These conclusions provide theoretical support for government departments to develop subsidy policies. Finally, a examples is given to prove the conclusions.