供应链契约稳定性及其在期权博弈视角下的优化

供应链契约作为一种有效的经营合作模式,已得到理论界和企业界广泛认同,并在实际的产业化经营中占据主导地位。由于市场需求及价格波动的不确定性引发的机会主义行为,导致契约在执行过程中存在逆向选择和道德风险,严重影响了产业化组织的运行效率。为探索供应链契约模式的稳定性并制定有效的优化策略,通过静态博弈模型得出供应链契约模式价格波动区间,进而深入分析了决策参数对契约稳定性的影响。在此基础上,借助期权市场的风险规避功能,寻求风险外化通道以协调契约主体间的利益冲突,为探索供应链契约模式中供应商的高违约率问题提供新的视角。

The Stability of Supply Chain Contract and Its Optimization Under the Perspective of Option Game

A supply chain contract mode is a market-oriented vertical product integration process from its production to sales. In the market economy, the execution of contracts is to maxmize profits, based on the assumptions of risk-neutral and fully rational game players. However, in a much volatile market, adverse selection and moral risk will occur when one player get losses under the normal supply chain contract mode. Therefore, high default rates for supply chain contracts will be vital to refrain from their executions without effective risk-sharing and behavior-constraint mechanisms. In this paper, the stability of supply chain contract modes are studied and optimization strategies are offered. Firstly, static game model is explored to obtain scopes of price fluctuations for supply chain contract modes. Secondly, detailed analysis is given to the impact of decision parameters on the stability of contract. Finally, a risk externality channel is sought to concert profit conflicts between contract parties, with the help of risk hedge function in options market. This no doubt offers a new prospective to solve the problem os high default rates in supply chain contract modes. Results show that such governance mechanisms as higher credits of contract parties, higher economic punishment coefficients, or more powerful default implementation measures, can help improve performance rates to some extent. But they can hardly eradicate market risks and occurrence of defaults. To solve high default rates for supply chain contract modes, it is vital to seek risk externality channel to coordinate the conflict of interest, with the help of risk treatment and prevention mechanisms in financial markets. As a result, market risk for supply chains can effectively be resolved in the options markets. From perspective of option games, by paying certain premiums under supply chain contract modes, supplier can effectively avoid market risks and meanwhile obtain benefits of rising prices. Manufacturers can fulfil steady efficient operations with higher incomes and more reliable supply stability.