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双边道德风险下中小节能服务企业与银行关系契约模型
引用本文:黄志烨,李桂君,汪涛.双边道德风险下中小节能服务企业与银行关系契约模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):10-17.
作者姓名:黄志烨  李桂君  汪涛
作者单位:中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 北京 100081
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71402200,71473285);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(11YJCZH072)
摘    要:基于合同能源管理机制运作的节能服务产业快速发展,产生了可观的节能效益,体现出巨大的市场需求和发展潜力。然而,我国的节能服务企业大多为自负盈亏的中小服务企业而难以获得银行贷款。基于此,本文从中小节能服务企业与银行的长期重复借贷合作关系出发,针对节能服务企业贷款过程中所存在的双边道德风险问题,引入银行贷款额度不足带来的潜在收益分享系数以设计激励机制,建立了中小节能服务企业与银行双边道德风险下长期关系契约规划模型,分析了银企关系契约下贴现因子的影响。本文的研究结果论证了银行与中小节能服务企业建立长期关系契约的可行性,银行应通过关系契约与中小节能服务企业建立长期合作关系,基于服务企业承诺的激励机制将有效提高节能服务企业服务效益,进而增加自身的投资效益,实现银企的双赢。

关 键 词:关系契约  节能服务  激励机制  中小企业  双边道德风险  
收稿时间:2015-02-03
修稿时间:2015-05-25

Relational Contract between Small and Medium-sized Energy Service Companies and Banks under Double Moral Hazard
HUANG Zhi-ye,LI Gui-jun,WANG Tao.Relational Contract between Small and Medium-sized Energy Service Companies and Banks under Double Moral Hazard[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2016,24(8):10-17.
Authors:HUANG Zhi-ye  LI Gui-jun  WANG Tao
Institution:School of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China
Abstract:Nowadays, energy service based on energy performance contracting (EPC) is developing fast as an emerging industry, which has made considerable benefits from energy conservation and reflected the huge market demand and development potential. However, most of China's energy service companies (ESCO) are small and medium-sized self-financing companies so that it is difficult for them to obtain bank loans due to lack of guarantee and credit history, and a long project cycle. To deal with this problem, from the view of relational contracts, the long-term relationship between small and medium-sized ESCOs and banks is examined in this paper. The incentive mechanism is designed to solve double moral hazard problem by sharing the potential gains of loan demand compensation. Relational contract programming model is established to determine the optimal level of participation and effort in cooperation between ESCOs and banks. Then, the incentive effect of the discount rate is further analyzed. The model analysis shows that "Self-enforcing" restraint is the key to the implementation of relational contract. With the discount rate increasing, the optimal level of participation and effort in cooperation between ESCOs and banks can be achieved by the increasing incentive effect of the relational contract. Moreover, both bank's earnings and system revenue under the relational contract are always not less than that under the formal contract. The conclusions demonstrate the feasibility of establishing long-term relational contract between banks and small and medium-sized ESCOs. The relational contract is suitable for small and medium-sized ESCOs and banks to establish long-term strategic partnership and achieve "win-win" situation in the long run.
Keywords:relational contract  energy service  incentive mechanism  small and medium-sized enterprises  double moral hazard  
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