产权性质、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应——基于政府补助的中介作用

 薪酬差距激励效应一直是理论研究和实证研究的热点。锦标赛理论和行为理论忽略了管理层权力的影响，因而对薪酬差距激励效应的解释能力有限。        将管理层权力引入研究框架，以政府补助为中介变量，检验管理层权力通过政府补助作用于薪酬差距的具体过程和经济后果，以及公司内外部机制的治理作用。特别地，考虑中国特殊的制度环境，国有企业改革导致管理层权力不断提升和膨胀，基于产权性质的视角展开对比研究。以2010年至2014年沪深A股上市公司7 999个观测值为样本，运用SAS 9.2和多元回归方法进行实证研究。        研究结果表明，在管理层权力的作用下，政府补助加剧高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距，与民营企业相比，国有企业获得的政府补助更能加大薪酬差距；进一步地，将薪酬差距分解为管理层从政府补助中攫取的权力性薪酬差距和剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距后发现，权力性薪酬差距起负向激励效应，降低企业未来绩效，并且在国有企业中权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应更强；剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距能够起到正面激励效应，提高企业未来绩效，并且该效应不因产权性质的不同而改变。        深入研究还发现，以董事会和政府干预为代表的内外部机制能够起到有效的治理作用，董事会规模越小、独立董事比例越高、董事会会议次数越多、政府干预程度越高，权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应越弱。        研究结论不仅为薪酬差距激励效应的研究提供理论上的补充，也为上市公司制定更优的薪酬契约和完善的治理机制提供理论依据和指导。

Nature of Property Rights, Managerial Power and Incentive Effects of Pay Gap:Intermediary Role of Government Subsidy

 The incentive effect of pay gap has always been the focus of theoretical and empirical research. Tournament theory and behavior theory both neglect the influence of managerial power, and thus have limited explanatory power to the incentive effect of pay gap. Therefore, the managerial power approach is introduced into the research framework. This paper examines the specific process and economic consequences of managerial power on the pay gap, using the government subsidy as the intermediary variable. Moreover, this paper also tests the governance role of the internal and external mechanisms of a company. In particular, taking the special institutional environment of China into consideration, the reform of state-owned enterprises leads to the continuous promotion and expansion of managerial power, so the comparative study is conducted on the basis of property rights.        Taking the 7 999 observations of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies spanning from 2010 to 2014 as the sample data, using SAS 9.2 software and multiple regression method, the empirical study shows that under the influence of managerial power, the government subsidy enlarges the pay gap between executives and employees. Compared to private enterprises, the pay gap is enlarged to a greater extent in state-owned enterprises when obtained government subsidy. Furthermore, after decomposing the pay gap into the powerful pay gap generated by government subsidy and the pay gap without the influence of government subsidy, it is found that the powerful pay gap exerts a negative incentive effect on the employees and reduces the future performance of the enterprise. In the state-owned enterprises, the negative incentive effect of the powerful pay gap is stronger. In contrast, the pay gap without the influence of government subsidy can play a positive incentive effect and improve the future performance of the enterprise, and this effect does not change due to the different property rights of the enterprises.        In-depth study also finds that internal and external mechanisms represented by board of directors and government intervention can play an effective governance role. A small board size and high proportion of independent directors can weaken the negative incentive effect of the powerful pay gap generated by government subsidy. Frequent board meetings and high government intervention can play the same governance role.        The research results not only provide theoretical supplement for the research of incentive effect of pay gap, but also provide theoretical basis and guidance for listed companies to formulate better compensation contract and perfect governance mechanism.