异质预期下股权制衡对公司并购绩效的影响

本文通过建立理论模型,对异质预期下股权制衡对公司并购绩效的影响进行了分析。研究结果发现:二级市场投资者的异质预期会引发并购交易后公司股价的下行调整,造成以股价反映的并购绩效出现下滑;在适当的异质预期下,公司大股东之间的股权制衡能够减缓并购绩效的下降幅度。股权制衡程度越高,并购绩效越好。但是,当投资者的异质预期逐渐增强,超出适当的范围时,股权制衡对并购绩效的影响呈现出非线性的特征。

TheInfluence of Check-and-balance Ownership Structure on the M & A Performance under Idiosyncratic Expectations

By a way of theory model establishment, the influence of check-and balance ownership structure on the M&A performance under idiosyncratic expectations is investigated in this paper. The results show that investors' idiosyncratic expectations will lead to the declining adjustment of acquirer's stock price after M&A transaction, and then result in the drop of M&A performance, which is measured by stock price. Under appropriate idiosyncratic expectations, the check-and-balance ownership structure will reduce the extent of M&A performance drop. The higher the check-and-balance degree is, the better the M&A performance will be. However, along with the strengthen of idiosyncratic expectations, the influence of check-and balance ownership structure on the M&A performance will become nonlinear when idiosyncratic expectations go beyond the appropriate range.