公平偏好下双代理人激励契约设计研究

具有多个代理人的机制设计问题通常讨论代理人之间的竞争关系，并且假设代理人的行为不受情感因素的影响和代理人的偏好只追求自己收益最大化而不考虑他人的收益。然而在实践中存在大量多个代理人之间可能合作的现象，并且代理人行为受情感因素影响和采用公平偏好。本文考虑人的行为受情感因素影响下，探讨信息不对称下具有公平偏好的双代理人选择竞争或合作行为时的委托代理问题。给出了激励代理人竞争或合作的条件、提出了代理人选择合作后的分配方式以及分析了人的情感因素和公平偏好对信息租金的影响。在不同偏好下得到如下结论：(1)代理人选择竞争时均有更大的最优努力水平。(2)激励代理人竞争或合作的条件会随着公平偏好而发生改变。(3)竞争系数、单位产出带来的收入、自豪强度越大，信息租金减少量越大；嫉妒强度、同情强度越大，信息租金减少量越小。(4)外部环境不确定性增加将促进代理人合作。研究结论可以应用于解决实际社会生产生活中委托人需要激励代理人去竞争或合作的两类委托代理问题。

Research on the Design of Double-agent Incentive Contract under Fairness Preference

The problem of mechanism design with multiple agents is usually discussed in terms of the competitive relationship between agents.Moreover, it is assumed that agents’ behaviors are not affected by emotional factors and agents’ preferences only pursue the maximization of their own benefits without considering the benefits of others. However, in practice, there is a large number of possible cooperation between multiple agents，and the agent’s behavior is affected by the emotion factor and the agent adopts the fair preference.Considering that human behaviors are affected by emotional factors, the principal-agent problem is discussed when two agents with fair preference choose competitive or cooperative behaviors under the condition of information asymmetry, the conditions are pointed out where the principal incentives agents to competition or cooperation, the ways of income distribution after agents choose cooperation are proposed, and it is discussed show the information rent generated by asymmetric information is affected by fairness preferences and behavior choice.The following conclusions are drawn from different preferences: i. agentsboth have higher optimal effort level in the case of competition, ii. the conditions under which the principal incentives agents to compete or cooperate change with the different fairness preferences, iii.the bigger the coefficient of competition, the income per unit of output, and the greater the intensity of pride, the bigger the reduction of information rent;the bigger the intensity of jealousy and sympathy, the smaller the reduction of information rent,iv.increased uncertainty of the external environment will promote the cooperation of agents. The research conclusions can be applied to solve two kinds of principal-agent problems that the principal needs to motivate the agent to compete or cooperate in the actual social production and life.