基于三方演化博弈的新创科技型企业集群网络嵌入机制研究

新创科技型企业嵌入集群网络既是企业快速成长的捷径，也是高技术产业集群提升竞争力的机会。本文构建了新创科技型企业、集群在位企业、政府三方演化博弈模型。分析了三方参与主体的演化稳定策略，并用数值仿真分析进一步验证了博弈结果。研究表明：演化稳定策略受成本、政府扶持力度，激励、惩罚以及各方初始参与意愿的影响；企业嵌入集群网络关注的是网络化优势带来的长久获益，而非单次合作获益；在结网初期，集群在位企业的参与比政府参与更有助于新创科技型企业成功嵌入集群网络；在结网后期，当新创科技型企业和集群在位企业参与意愿较高后，政府可以逐渐退出对企业结网行为的支持。

Study on the Cluster Network Embedding Process of New Technology-Oriented Enterprises Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

New technology-oriented enterprises’ embedding into cluster network is not only a shortcut for the rapid growth of enterprises, but also an opportunity to enhance the competitiveness of cluster network. The evolutionary game method is used to established the tripartite game model among new technology-oriented enterprises,enterprises already embedded in the cluster and government. The evolutionary stability strategy of the three participants is analyzed, and the results are further verified by numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the evolutionary stable strategy is influenced by the cost, the support from the government, the incentive value, the penalty value and the participants’ initial willingness to participate. Enterprises focuses on the long-term benefits brought by networking advantages rather than the benefits of a single collaboration. In the initial stage of forming cluster network, the participation of enterprises already embedded in the cluster is more conducive to the successful embedding of new technology-oriented enterprises than that of the government. In the later stage of forming cluster network, when enterprises’ willingness to participate is high, government can gradually withdraw its support for enterprises’ network establishment.