供应链的利润博弈与均衡定价

供应链涉及多个利益主体，优化供应链的全局效益需要成员企业的协调来实现。效率评估的非参数法应用广泛，但是单纯的效率优化未考虑资源的可替代性和再分配，忽视了投入(产出)结构调整释放的优化空间。对于效率分解，取折衷或单边最优的方案不完全符合企业追求各自利益最大化的目标。本文针对两级供应链的利润优化问题建立一般化的分析框架，同时考虑了技术进步和资源可替代性的影响，对成员企业的利润博弈展开讨论，探讨了合作博弈如何促成供应链实现集权模式下的最优。通过建立议价模型得出了纳什均衡基础上的成员企业最优利润组合，并给出了实现最优分配方案的中间产品均衡定价。

Supply Chain Profit Game and Equilibrium Pricing

A supply chain involves multiple enterprises. It is often complicated to deal with the relationship between the benefits of member enterprises and the overall benefit of the supply chain. There are even conflicts of interest between the upstream and downstream, resulting in the decline of the overall benefit. Only by optimizing the overall benefit and designing an effective profit distribution mechanism to achieve the coordination of member enterprises, can the supply chain achieve the optimality. The nonparametric method for efficiency evaluation has been widely used in this field. However, the simple optimization of efficiency does not consider the substitutability and reallocation of resources, and ignores the optimization space released by the adjustment of input and output structures. For efficiency decomposition, the compromise or unilateral optimal solution is not in line with enterprises’ goal of maximizing their own interests. Based on the nonparametric modeling method, a general analysis framework is established for the profit optimization of a two-echelon supply chain, considering the impacts of both technical advancement and resource substitutability. How the cooperative game can promote the supply chain to realize the optimality under the centralized case is discussed. The distribution of the optimized overall profit of the supply chain is studied via a profit game of member enterprises. The game relations between member enterprises are established based on their individual profit baselines. It is identified that there may be multiple equilibrium schemes for profit distribution. To obtain an optimal profit combination of member enterprises, a bargaining model is proposed. The pricing of intermediate products to achieve the optimal equilibrium distribution scheme is given. An illustrative example is provided to examine the above analysis on supply chain profits. The profits of the ten supply chains involved as a result of technical efficiency improvement and resource reallocation are compared with their current profit levels. Also, the profit distribution results without bargaining are compared to that with bargaining. It is shown that the proposed model is effective to realize the profit optimization of supply chains and the equilibrium profit distribution to member enterprises with the appropriate pricing of intermediate products. A modeling framework is thus provided for a preliminary quantitative analysis on the improvement of supply chain profits through cooperative games. The proposed model for a two-echelon structure can be extended to multi-echelon or even network structures.