公平偏好视角下的专利联盟企业创新行为演化研究

专利联盟的专利交叉许可机制使专利具有了公共品属性，在无有效机制引导下，部分企业搭便车行为必然会影响其他成员持续研发的积极性，不利于联盟稳定发展。本文在公平偏好视角下，构建了专利联盟企业公共品博弈模型，通过利用费米规则在MATLAB上模拟专利联盟企业创新行为演化过程，分析了联盟企业创新行为内在动机，并进一步引入惩罚机制，探究其对联盟企业创新行为演化过程的影响。结果表明：当嫉妒参数与羞愧参数之比低于某一阈值时，整个联盟才能呈现出稳定的高研发水平。在利己倾向的公平偏好情景下，在公共品回报乘数越高，却越会刺激搭便车；而在利他倾向的公平偏好情景下，当专利公共品回报乘数增加并超过阈值时，会促使整个联盟企业努力研发，此时许可收益增加也更有利于提高企业努力研发积极性，而且当存在联合惩罚机制时，惩罚也更有效果，但惩罚系数与惩罚成本之比必须大于某一阈值，才能抑制企业搭便车行为。最后提出了在专利联盟管理实践中促进企业积极创新的建议。

Research on the Evolution of Patent Alliance Enterprise Innovation Behavior from the Perspective of Fairness Preference

The typical public goods attributes of patents in the patent pool are given by the patent cross-licensing clauses existing within the patent union. Based on the traditional public goods game view, under the guidance of no effective mechanism, the free riders of the alliance members cannot be avoided, and the group’s falling into the public goods dilemma must be caused by the individual’s pursuit of maximizing benefits. However, it has been verified by a large number of public goods experiments that with the repeated game, even if the supply of public goods generally shows a downward trend, voluntary supply of public goods still exists. It pointed out by some scholars that this phenomenon can be mainly explained by the theory of fair preference. Behavioral economics believes that people in reality care not only about their own interests but also those of others. Therefore, The factors that affect the innovation behavior of patent union members are explored from the perspective of fair preference, which provides a way of thinking for solving the problem of free riders within the patent union.