首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

机构投资者参与公司治理的博弈分析
引用本文:曹玉贵. 机构投资者参与公司治理的博弈分析[J]. 华北水利水电学院学报(社会科学版), 2006, 22(2): 1-4
作者姓名:曹玉贵
作者单位:华北水利水电学院,经济管理系,河南,郑州,450011
摘    要:“股东积极主义”已经演进成为西方证券市场的一个重要特征。根据经济博弈论分析了机构投资者积极参与公司治理的条件。通过博弈分析表明,机构投资者积极参与公司治理的动力主要取决于成本与收益的比较,具体决定于机构投资者的持股比例、持股时间和监督成本等。同时基于博弈分析的结果,提出了提高我国机构投资者积极参与公司治理动力的政策建议。

关 键 词:机构投资者  股东积极主义  博弈分析
文章编号:1008-4444(2006)02-0001-04
修稿时间:2006-03-02

Game Analysis on Institutional Shareholder Activism and Suggestion
CAO Yu-gui. Game Analysis on Institutional Shareholder Activism and Suggestion[J]. Journal of North China Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power(Social Sciences Edition), 2006, 22(2): 1-4
Authors:CAO Yu-gui
Abstract:Institutional Shareholder Activism has become an important characteristic in Western securities market.According to economy game,the condition of institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance is analysized in this paper.It shows that the motive force of institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance depends on the comparison of cost and income,to be exact,on the proportion and time of share-holding,and supervising cost,etc.Meanwhile,suggestions are put forward based on the result of game analysis on how to raise the motive force of China's institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance.
Keywords:Institutional investor  Shareholder activism  Game analysis
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号