高速公路服务质量提升的博弈分析

以完全信息静态博弈理论为基础,分别构建高速公路运营商与行业主管部门、顾客以及各高速公路运营商之间的博弈模型.模型分析发现：短期内,提高服务质量的概率与惩罚成本和监管成本有关,而长期则与行业主管部门形象收益、监管成本以及惩罚成本有关;考虑顾客流动,当高速公路服务质量改善和不改善引起的顾客转移收益之和大于其可能支付的总成本时,存在纳什均衡;当服务质量提高后短期利润小于提高前且转入新客源的收益大于支付的成本时,存在纳什均衡.

Analysis of the Improvement of Highway Service Quality with Game Theory

To explore the conditions and motivation of improving the quality of highway service, this paper used complete information static game theory and established model between highway operators and competent departments of the industry and the one between highway operators and their customers respectively. Conclusions are as follows ： in the short term, the probability of improving service quality is concerned with punishment cost and supervision cost, and in the long term, it is concerned with the image revenue, supervision cost and punishment cost of the competent departments of the industry. As for the customer flow, Nash equilibrium appears when customer transfer income, including that influenced by highway service quality improvement and non improvement, is more than the possible cost. If we assume short-term profits caused by service quality improvement is less than before, Nash equilibrium occurs if the earnings from new customers are more than the cost.