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国有企业债转股的博弈论模型
引用本文:蒲勇健,杨丽铃,赵倩.国有企业债转股的博弈论模型[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2001,7(4):21-25.
作者姓名:蒲勇健  杨丽铃  赵倩
作者单位:重庆大学工商管理学院,
基金项目:中国信达资产管理公司资助项目,,
摘    要:我国国有企业债转股是借鉴国外成功实践经验 ,并结合国内实际情况而采取的国有企业改革的重要手段。本文通过构建完全信息与不完全信息动态博弈模型 ,导出政府、银行、企业三方局中人在实施债转股中所达到的子博弈精炼纳什均衡 ,分析了国有商业银行在企业债转股后为防范再贷款风险而应采取的经营对策

关 键 词:债转股  国企改革  金融
文章编号:1008-5831(2001)04-0021-05
修稿时间:2001年12月20日

A Game Theory Model of Swap of Debt to Equity in State-owned Enterprises
PU Yong jian,YANG Li ling,ZHAO Qian.A Game Theory Model of Swap of Debt to Equity in State-owned Enterprises[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Social Sciences Edition),2001,7(4):21-25.
Authors:PU Yong jian  YANG Li ling  ZHAO Qian
Abstract:Learning from the successful and practical experience of some foreign countries, and combining it with the reality of China, the government has been performing the swap of debt to equity for helping the state owned enterprises out of the morass It is an important measure taken by the government to proceed the reformation of the state owned enterprises By constructing dynamic game model of complete information and incomplete information, this paper deduces the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium among government, bank and enterprises during the swap and analyzes the operating countermeasures which the state owned commerical bank should take after swap
Keywords:swap of debt to equity  state  owned enterprises reformation  finance
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