我国油气资源开发中两级政府利益博弈分析

在我国油气资源开发利用过程中，中央政府和地方政府存在着强烈的利益冲突。为此利用博弈分析方法，建立两级政府完全信息动态博弈模型，证明了我国油气资源收益分配制度的不合理是造成两级政府之间发生博弈的根本原因，同时也说明了只有通过二者之间的博弈，才能使我国资源收益分配制度趋于合理，从而实现中央政府和地方政府利益博弈的相对均衡。

Analysis of Interest Game between the Central Government and Local Government in the Exploitation of Oil and Gas Resources

In the exploitation of oil and gas resources,there is a strong conflict of benefits between the central government and local government.Therefore,the game theory is applied to building up the dynamic game model of complete information for two-levels of governments.And it is proven that the unreasonable benefit distribution system in our country is the root cause that brings about the interest game between two levels of governments.Meanwhile,only by the game between two levels of governments,can our national system of resource benefit distribution tend to be reasonable in the future,and thus achieving the relative balance in the interest game between central government and local government.