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竞合视角下企业组织联盟知识共享演化与激励
引用本文:吴文清,张海红,赵黎明.竞合视角下企业组织联盟知识共享演化与激励[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2015,17(5):63-68.
作者姓名:吴文清  张海红  赵黎明
作者单位:天津大学管理与经济学部,天津,300072;天津大学管理与经济学部,天津,300072;天津大学管理与经济学部,天津,300072
基金项目:国家社会科学基金资助项目(13CGL018);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20130032120014)
摘    要:基于知识共享基本价值、效应、影响因素的分析, 构造企业组织联盟各方知识共享的收益函数, 建立知识共享的演化博弈模型, 研究知识共享群体的演化稳定策略, 讨论各种情形企业组织联盟竞合下知识共享群体系统均衡点的存在性和稳定性, 以及竞合下知识共享双方知识吸收能力、价值增值、杠杆作用、协同效应、负面影响、共享成本、声誉损失、边际收益等因素对企业组织联盟知识共享群体演化的作用。研究结果表明:企业组织联盟形成知识共享稳定状态的概率与价值增值、负面影响、共享成负相关, 与杠杆作用、协同效应、声誉损失正相关, 与知识吸收能力无关。可通过降低企业组织联盟独自拥有的知识的价值、降低知识共享的负面影响、建立声誉机制、降低知识共享成本来促进企业组织联盟向理想状态演化。

关 键 词:知识共享  竞合  演化博弈  协同效应  声誉损失  共享成本
收稿时间:2014/9/11 0:00:00

Evolution and Motivation of Enterprise Alliance Knowledge Sharing under Coopetition
WU Wenqing,ZHANG Haihong and ZHAO Liming.Evolution and Motivation of Enterprise Alliance Knowledge Sharing under Coopetition[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2015,17(5):63-68.
Authors:WU Wenqing  ZHANG Haihong and ZHAO Liming
Institution:1.College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Abstract:The basic value, effect and influence factors of knowledge sharing are analyzed, revenue function of enterprise alliance is constructed, evolutionary game model of the cooperation of all parties is established, and the evolutionary stable strategy of the knowledge sharing group is researched. In this paper, the existence and stability of equilibrium in knowledge sharing group system are discussed under various coopetition situations, and the factors that affect the evolution equilibrium such as knowledge absorption ability, value-added, leveragability, synergy, negative reverse-impact, sharing cost, loss of reputation and marginal revenue are analyzed. The results show that probability of enterprise alliance forming a knowledge sharing stable state is in negative correlation with value-added, negative reverse-impact and sharing cost, and is in positive correlation with leveragability, synergy, and loss of reputation, while not related to knowledge absorption ability. It can promote the alliance to the ideal state by reducing the value of own kowledge, reducing the negative effect of knowledge sharing, establishing reputation mechanism and reducing the cost of knowledge sharing.
Keywords:knowledge sharing  coopetition  evolutionary game  synergy  reputation loss  sharing costs
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