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Tacit Coordination in Choice Between Certain Outcomes in Endogenously Determined Lotteries |
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| Authors: | Rapoport Amnon Seale Darryl A. Ordóñez Lisa |
| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Management and Policy, 405 McClelland Hall, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA;(2) Department of Management, 4505 Maryland Parkway, University of Nevada in Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV 89154, USA;(3) Department of Management and Policy, 405 McClelland Hall, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA |
| Abstract: | Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model. |
| Keywords: | interactive decision making lotteries Nash equilibrium tacit coordination |
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